Societal Level of Religiosity and Religious Identity Expression in Europe

Jolanda van der Noll¹, Anette Rohmann¹, and Vassilis Saroglou²

Abstract
Growing diversity in terms of values and worldviews is one of the main challenges in current European societies. It is often argued that, in these societies, suspicion toward some aspects and forms of religion, if not religion in general is one of the main obstacles toward the acceptance of minority religious practices. In this article, we focused on the role of religion as a part of culture across European societies in allowing or inhibiting the expression of a religious identity by wearing visible religious symbols in the workplace. We examined the, intuitive but still to be tested, assumption that religious identity expression is more accepted in societies with an elevated level of societal religiosity in a European context. Using the 2006 data of Eurobarometer 65.4 on discrimination, we examined differences in the acceptance of religious identity expression through support for wearing visible religious symbols in 26 European societies. Results of multilevel analyses showed cross-societal variation in the acceptance of wearing visible religious symbols and that societal religiosity positively predicts the acceptance of religious identity expression. Our results showed that it is meaningful to differentiate between European countries when examining the role of cultural characteristics at the societal level when analyzing individual attitudes related to identity expressions and their acceptance.

Keywords
intergroup relations/prejudice, religion, Europe, tolerance

Growing diversity in terms of values and worldviews is one of the main challenges in current European societies. In this article, we focused on the role of the average religiosity in a society as a part of culture in allowing or inhibiting the expression of a religious identity by wearing visible religious symbols. The presence of religious symbols—most notably headscarves worn by Muslim women, but also Christian crucifixes in classrooms—has become a major issue in recent debates and controversies in European societies. This raised the question to what extent religiosity (or some of its forms) is part of Europe’s current identity and culture.

Some scholars (e.g., Foner & Alba, 2008; Niebuhr, 2007; Zolberg & Woon, 1999) have suggested that the societal level of religiosity may relate to the extent to which people support (minority) religious practices; a stronger societal religiosity, as is, for example, the case in the

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United States, would encourage the acceptance of religious claims and affirmations at the individual level. However, the idea that the societal level of religiosity may predict individual attitudes relating to religious diversity has not yet been tested empirically. Furthermore, research on the role of religion in a European context is almost exclusively focused on countries in Western Europe (Bail, 2008), which are highly secularized (Berger, Davie, & Fokas, 2008). Therefore, still little is known about the extent to which differences in average religiosity across societies predict acceptance of religious and cultural identity expression. If an elevated level of societal religiosity would indeed encourage a wider acceptance of expression of a religious identity, this should also become apparent in comparisons within Europe between the more secularized and the more religious societies.

Hence, in the present research, we examined to what extent differences in societal religiosity accounted for cross-European differences in individual opinions on religious identity expression through acceptance of wearing visible religious symbols. Using data of the Eurobarometer 65.4 (European Commission, 2012b), we explored whether societal religiosity is associated with a higher acceptance of the wearing of religious symbols in the workplace. Before presenting our analyses and results, we outline in the following sections the importance of investigating the role of religion in European societies and how societal religiosity can contribute to acceptance of religious identity expression. We then propose possible alternative explanations for societal-level differences in acceptance of religious identity expression. Here, we focus on religious traditions and a society’s legislation, the experience with communism, globalization—including religious diversity and the presence of Muslim minority groups—cultural values and aggregated personality traits. As individual-level explanations we include individual religious affiliation, openness to religious pluralism, and sociodemographic characteristics.

Religious Identity in Europe

Religion is one of the aspects, in addition to language, territory, a common history, and descent that can define cultural entities (Saroglou & Cohen, 2011). As such, religion can form the basis to draw boundaries between different ethnic or national groups, or between the host society and immigrant population (Kunovich, 2006). To a large extent, contemporary Europe is perceived to be secular. The importance of traditional Christian institutions in public life is diminished and service attendance—in both Catholic and Protestant churches—has sharply declined over the years (Berger et al., 2008). Moreover, survey research revealed low numbers of people who believe in God, life after death, or Jesus as redeemer, or indicate that religion is important in their lives (e.g., Voas, 2009).

Western and Central Europe are indeed the most secularized areas in the Western world (Berger et al., 2008). However, in other European countries, for example, Poland or Southern European countries, people are found to be generally more religious, to attend religious services more frequently, and to attach more importance to God than it is the case in Western European countries (Halman, Sieben, & van Zundert, 2011). Yet, even in the more secularized societies in Western and Central Europe, Christian traditions remain present in the organization of society. Public holidays, such as Christmas and Easter, are aligned to Christian feasts, and several countries, despite their secular character, have a state Church, or special arrangements with some religious communities (Fox, 2008). Furthermore, over the recent years, there have been a number of debates suggesting that religion—as a tradition and values, rather than specific practices or beliefs—is more important for European identity and culture than is often assumed. Negotiations about the European constitution in the early 2000s, for example, sparked debates on the importance of religion—and Christianity in particular—for the European identity (Schlesinger & Foret, 2006). Although predominant Catholic countries (Italy, Poland, Lithuania, Malta, Portugal, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia) wanted a specific reference to God or Christianity to be included in the constitution’s preamble, secular countries such as France and Belgium, and Protestant Nordic countries like Denmark and Sweden objected to such a reference (Black, 2004).
Religion as a component of a European identity and culture also became a salient factor in discussions about the possibility of Turkey joining the European Union. In addition to political and economic concerns, cultural considerations seem to play an important role in the opposition toward Turkish EU-membership (Hurd, 2006). Finally, religion plays an important role in discussions on immigrant integration in the European context. Experimental research in Germany suggested that perceived cultural differences between the majority population and immigrant groups played an important role regarding the perception of threats from immigrants. Culturally dissimilar groups (Turkish immigrants and a fictitious group described as dissimilar) were perceived to be more threatening than cultural similar groups (Italian immigrants and a fictitious group described as similar; Rohmann, Piontkowski, & van Randenborgh, 2008). As many of today’s immigrants in Europe have a Muslim background, religion may constitute a relevant dimension to evaluate immigrants. Kunovich (2006), for example, showed, based on representative data of 17 European societies, that being Christian was indeed considered more important for a nation’s identity in countries with larger Muslim populations. Furthermore, studies have shown that many Europeans are uncomfortable with the demands from predominantly Muslim minorities to be able to carry out what they perceive as their religious practices and obligations, for example, adhering to specific dress code, applying food constraints in the public sphere, or praying at specific times at work (e.g., Helbling, 2014; Saroglou, Lamkaddem, Pachterbeke, & Buxant, 2009; Van der Noll, 2014).

A common assumption is therefore, that despite the process of secularization and decline in religious practice over the years, Christianity (i.e., Christian faith, worldviews, and civilization) remains a defining feature of a European identity and culture (e.g., Foner & Alba, 2008; Zolberg & Woon, 1999). Indeed, research on symbolic boundaries identified religion, and in particular, a religious identity embedded in Christianity, as one of the salient symbolic boundaries in the European context (Foner & Alba, 2008; Zolberg & Woon, 1999). This is in contrast to the United States, where a more deistic civil religious identity, which can easily be extended to different religions, prevails (Zolberg & Woon, 1999). The cross-religious sympathy usually found in the United States is, according to Gordon (2008), also an explanation why the wearing of headscarves by Muslim women is less controversial in the United States than in France.

Societal Religiosity and Attitudes Toward Religious Identity Expression

The review above suggests that, in contrast to the popular perception that Europe is secular, religion, and especially a specific Christian understanding of religiosity, remains important for Europe’s identity. However, the studies that compared the role of religion in the United States and Europe also highlighted another difference that may account for differences in how these societies approach demands by religious groups: The overall level of religiosity is higher in the United States than in European countries (Berger et al., 2008; Foner & Alba, 2008; Niebuhr, 2007; Zolberg & Woon, 1999). As such, being religious constitutes a social norm for the majority in the United States, and the observance of religious obligations is therefore highly valued. Religious claims, for example, related to clothing, may thus have more legitimacy in the United States than in Europe (Cesari, 2004; Foner & Alba, 2008). These studies however mainly focused on Western Europe, most notably France, Germany, and Britain, which are among the most secularized societies in the Western world (Berger et al., 2008). Subsequently, the salience of a religious symbolic boundary in the European context has only been studied in these countries (Bail, 2008). It could therefore well be that the religious symbolic boundary identified in the European context is not a boundary around a specific European Christian identity, but rather a boundary contrasting the secular and nonreligious majority with religious minorities.

Although it may be a plausible explanation, the role of societal religiosity for the acceptance of religious identity expression has not yet been empirically tested. If the societal level of religiosity is indeed a decisive factor of how people in a society approach the accommodation of
(minority) religious expression, this pattern should also emerge if comparisons between European societies are made. To date, such an empirical comparison of the role of societal religiosity across European societies is missing. The present study fills that gap by examining how variations in societal religiosity across European societies contribute to individual-level acceptance of religious identity expression.

**Religious Traditions and Religious Legislation as an Explanation for Cross-National Differences**

Our main aim is to test the theoretical assumption that a higher societal religiosity is related to people’s acceptance of religious identity expression. European societies do however not only differ in their societal level of religiosity but also in their religious traditions and how religion is regulated by the government. In this section, we outline why these aspects may also predict differences in the acceptance of religious identity expression.

Extensive research based on the World Value Survey suggests that there are two broad cultural dimensions, on which societies can be placed (Inglehart & Welzel, 2011). The first dimension, that is traditional versus secular-rational values, addresses, among others, the importance of religion, authority, and the role of the family. European societies are typically placed toward the secular-rational end on this dimension. The second dimension contrasts survival values, which emphasize the importance of economic and physical security, with self-expression values, which highlight the importance of participation in decision-making, tolerance, and equality. It is mainly on this dimension that different clusters among European societies can be distinguished based on their religious traditions. Most Christian Orthodox societies are found to score low on this dimension, meaning that they tend to emphasize survival values. European Protestant societies are located on the other end, stressing self-expression values. European Catholic countries can be placed between these two clusters (Inglehart & Welzel, 2011). In line with the idea that religious denominational traditions of a society may predict individual values and attitudes, Traunmüller (2011) found that social trust among Germans was higher in Protestant regions than in Catholic regions, regardless of individual level of religiosity. Based on these findings, we expected that religious tradition would contribute to cross-European differences in acceptance of religious identity expression. Following the cultural map of the World Values Survey (Inglehart & Welzel, 2011), we expected to find more support for religious identity expression in countries with a Protestant cultural heritage, followed by countries with a Catholic heritage. We expected least support in Orthodox societies.

Furthermore, European societies have historically different ways of approaching religion in the public sphere. In France, for example, there is a strict separation between State and Church, whereas other countries, such as Great Britain or Denmark have a state church (Barro & McCleary, 2005). Several studies have shown that legislation can shape social norms and public attitudes, for example, in the realm of prostitution (Kotsadam & Jakobsson, 2011), acceptance of homosexuality (Kuntz, Davidov, Schwartz, & Schmidt, 2015), and immigration attitudes (Ryo, 2017). These studies showed that more restrictive legislation predict negative attitudes. It is therefore likely that the extent to which religious affairs are regulated by the state is related to the acceptance of religious identity expression. Based on these findings, we expected a stricter government regulation of religion to be negatively associated with individual support for the wearing of religious symbols.

**Further Explanations**

In the previous sections, we outlined why we expected societal religiosity, religious denominational tradition, and religious legislation to explain cross-European differences in acceptance of religious identity expression. There may however be further societal characteristics that may predict...
cross-European differences in individual acceptance of religious identity expression. The societal characteristics that we deemed most relevant in the context of our study and thus controlled for in the analyses were a society’s experience with communism and degree of globalization—including religious diversity and the size of a society’s Muslim minority population. Furthermore, there are some characteristics of a society’s population as a whole that may relate to societal religiosity as well as individual support for religious identity expression. In this study, we controlled for the societal endorsement of the cultural values autonomy and egalitarianism, and the aggregated personality traits agreeableness and conscientiousness. Finally, cross-European differences could also be attributed to differences between members of these societies. In our study, we controlled for individual religious affiliation, openness to religious pluralism, gender, age, and political orientation. The rationale for these control variables are outlined below.

### Societal Characteristics

An aspect of cultural heritage relevant to the European context today is whether a society experienced a communist past. According to the cultural map based on the World Values Survey, post-communist societies tend to emphasize survival values over self-expression values (Inglehart & Welzel, 2011). A comparative study of tolerance in Western and Eastern Europe revealed that people in former communist countries were less likely to extend civil liberties to their least liked group than people in Western Europe (Marquart-Pyatt & Paxton, 2007). Furthermore, Hadler (2012) showed that both xenophobia and homophobia were more prominent in former communist societies. Therefore, we expected to find less support for religious identity expression in post-communist societies, compared with societies with no communist past.

Globalization is the increasing integration of countries, societies, and cultures in the world. Its effects are however debatable. Although it is often thought that this process, through increased exposure to democratic ideas as well as foreign people and cultures, can be conducive to tolerance of alternative lifestyles (Kaya & Karakoç, 2012), it has also been argued that increased integration of countries and cultures, and subsequently an increased religiously diverse society, triggers a desire to hold on to national and religious culture (Kinnvall, 2004). Using data from almost 150 countries, Ben-Nun Bloom, Arikan, and Sommer (2014) found that globalization offers an important explanation for legislation that restricts religious freedom, and for increased perceptions of threat among individuals. We expected, based on the findings of that previous research (Ben-Nun Bloom et al., 2014; Kaya & Karakoç, 2012), lower levels of acceptance of religious identity expression in societies that score higher on globalization and in societies with more religious diversity.

Increased religious diversity in European societies has especially become visible with the influx and settlement of a large number of immigrants with an Islamic background. The findings regarding globalization suggest that people in countries with a larger proportion of Muslim immigrants or immigrant descent would be more inclined to hold on to their national and religious culture (Kinnvall, 2004). Kunovich (2006) indeed showed that Christianity was considered to be more important for national identity in countries with larger Muslim populations. It is currently unclear how a larger Muslim population within a European society would relate to acceptance of religious identity expression in general. In this study, we will explore the effect of this variable.

### Population Characteristics

Regarding the characteristics of a society’s population, it has been found that cultural value orientations and certain personality traits were related to societal religiosity. Based on his theory on basic human values, Schwartz (2006) proposed that there are seven cultural value orientations
that can be organized along three dimensions (intellectual and affective autonomy vs. embeddedness; egalitarianism vs. hierarchy; and harmony vs. mastery) and that these cultural value orientations are associated with individual social attitudes, such as which qualities children should learn. People are, for example, more likely to oppose behavior that threatens traditional values and sexual norms in societies that emphasize embeddedness, hierarchy, and mastery. The cultural value orientations of autonomy, egalitarianism, and harmony, on the contrary, were found to encourage the acceptance of immigrants, as well as of homosexuality, abortion, and divorce (Schwartz, 2006). The cultural value of autonomy focuses on the ability of people to follow their individual ways of thinking, feeling, and acting, and is contrasted to being embedded in collective entities such as religion. Egalitarianism (vs. hierarchy) concerns how people relate to one another. In societies where egalitarianism is endorsed, people are seen as moral equals and dismiss hierarchy and authority (Schwartz, 2006). In relation to religion, it can be expected that societies that score high on autonomy and egalitarianism will place less value on religion, thus have a lower societal level of religiosity. Also, as these societies tend to reject prescribed obligations from, for example, religious groups, acceptance of religious identity expression may be reduced. It may thus be that cross-national variations in the acceptance of religious identity expression can be explained by cross-national differences in the endorsement of these cultural values of autonomy and egalitarianism, instead of societal religiosity.

Furthermore, the psychological functions of religiosity correspond with personality traits reflected in agreeableness, like the need to belong and search for quality in interpersonal relations, and conscientiousness, such as the need for personal and social order and achievement of goals in life (Saroglou, 2017). The correlations between these personality traits and religiosity have not only been found at the individual level (Saroglou, 2010) but also at the societal level. Societies that have higher societal mean level values of agreeableness and conscientiousness were found to be more religious (McCrae, 2002; Mõttus, Allik, & Realo, 2010; Rentfrow, Gosling, & Potter, 2008). Therefore, we controlled for the relationship between these two personality traits and societal religiosity in explaining acceptance of religious identity expression.

**Individual Characteristics**

Some of the cross-European differences could be attributed to differences between members of these societies. In our study, we controlled for individual religious affiliation, openness to religious pluralism, gender, age, and political orientation.²

Previous research has shown that contemporary Christian believers in European societies were found to be more favorable of (Muslim) religious identity expression (Fasel, Green, & Sarrasin, 2013; Saroglou et al., 2009). It may be that opposing the wearing of (foreign) religious symbols could pose a threat to believers’ own freedom to express their religious identity. To control for whether respondents identify with a religious group, we included the religious affiliation of the respondent.

Furthermore, openness to religious pluralism may explain differences in support for religious identity expression at the individual level. Research in the Netherlands has shown, for example, that people who endorsed multiculturalism were more likely to grant Muslim minorities the freedom to follow their own practices (Van der Noll, 2012). We expected people who are open to religious pluralism to be more in favor of supporting expressions of religious identity.

Finally, we controlled for sociodemographic characteristics of the respondents, including gender, age, and political orientation. Research on (religious) tolerance found that men (Golebiowska, 1999), older respondents (Chandler & Tsai, 2001), and those with a more right-wing political orientation (Thorisdottir, Jost, Liviatan, & Shrout, 2007) were more likely to be intolerant of different lifestyles. We therefore expected men, older respondents, and people with a more right-wing political orientation to be more opposed toward religious identity expression.
Method

Analyses were based on the Eurobarometer 65.4 (collected in 2006, see European Commission, 2012b), which included a module on discrimination in the European Union. The Standard and Special Eurobarometer were initiated in 1974 by the European Commission to monitor public opinion among the population of the member states of the European Union. Data for Eurobarometer 65.4 were collected through face-to-face interviews between June and July 2006 in the 25 European Union member states, plus Bulgaria and Romania—which joined the European Union in 2007. Separate samples were drawn for Northern Ireland and East Germany. As these societies differ in their political history, religious tradition, and the salience of religion, we maintained them separate in the analyses.

For our societal-level variables, we relied on secondary data sources. For these measures, we either constructed indicators based on the Eurobarometer 63.1 (collected in 2005, European Commission, 2012a) or relied on existing indices. Details are outlined below (see also Table 1).

Sample

A total of 26,822 respondents participated in the Eurobarometer 65.4. Respondents who did not answer our outcome variable regarding the acceptance of religious identity expression were excluded from the analyses ($n = 2,201$). This resulted in a total sample size of 24,621 respondents in 29 societies.
Measures

**Outcome variable.** To measure the acceptance of religious identity expression, we used respondents’ agreement with the statement that “The wearing of visible religious symbols in the workplace is acceptable” (4-point scale; 1 = totally agree to 4 = totally disagree).

**Societal-level variables.** To account for the societal level of religiosity, we relied on data from the Eurobarometer 63.1, using the percentage of people who indicated to believe in God. For a society’s religious denominational tradition, we determined, also based on the Eurobarometer 63.1, the dominant religious denomination per society. Following Fox (2008, p. 108), we categorized societies as being Catholic (14 countries), Protestant (3), Orthodox (4), or Mixed (8) when not one Christian religious affiliation dominated.

To capture how religion is regulated by the government, we relied on the Government Regulation Index (GRI) developed by Grim and Finke (2006). Based on the 2003 International Religious Freedom Report (U.S. State Department, 2003), these authors constructed this index which measures the state’s regulation of practice, profession, and selection of religion.

We constructed a dummy variable that reflected whether a society experienced a communist past (0 = no, 1 = yes). To account for globalization, we included the globalization index of Dreher and colleagues (Dreher, 2006; Dreher, Gaston, Martens, & Martens, 2008), which distinguishes between economic, political, and social globalization. As religious diversity is mostly related to social globalization (i.e., the spread of ideas, information, images, and people), we focused on this globalization measure in this study. For religious diversity, we used the religious fractionalization index (Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat, & Wacziarg, 2003), which measures the probability that two randomly drawn individuals belong to different religious groups.

For a society’s percentage of Muslims, we used data from the Pew Research Center (2009). It should be noted, however, as most societies do not register religious affiliation of the population, these are rough estimates based on various sources, including national censuses, demographic and health surveys, and other general population surveys (Pew Research Center, 2009). In addition, we constructed a dummy variable reflecting that Muslims constitute an historic minority (0 = no, 1 = yes) in three countries (Bulgaria, Cyprus, and Greece).

For cultural value orientations (intellectual and affective autonomy and egalitarianism), we used responses of urban school teachers and university students to the Schwartz Value Survey (see Schwartz, 2006). Higher scores reflect a stronger endorsement of the respective values. For the personality traits agreeableness and conscientiousness, we relied on the scores reported in Gebauer et al. (2015, p. 531). Higher scores reflect higher mean personality traits.

**Individual-level variables.** At the individual level, we included the respondent’s religious affiliation. Respondents were asked whether they considered themselves to belong to a particular religious denomination. In our analyses, we distinguished between Catholic, Protestant, Orthodox, other-Christian, non-Christian, and nonreligious. To measure openness to religious pluralism, we relied on a measure indicating whether respondents had any friends or acquaintances having a different religion or different beliefs (0 = no, 1 = yes). As friendships reflect voluntary contact, we used this as a proxy for openness to religious pluralism. Political orientation was measured on a 10-point scale ranging from left (1) to right (10), age was measured in years, and gender was a dichotomous variable (0 = man, 1 = woman). Descriptive statistics per society are presented in Table 2.

**Analyses.** To account for the two-level structure of the data, with respondents nested in societies, we conducted multilevel analyses in R v.3.4.0 using the nlme package (Pinheiro, Bates, DebRoy, Sarkar, & Core Team, 2017; R Core Team, 2017). Cultural value orientation scores were missing for Malta, Luxembourg, and Lithuania, and these societies were excluded from the multilevel
analyses. Furthermore, we excluded 476 respondents, as they had missing values at the individual-level variable openness to religious pluralism (missing values on this variable were below 6% in all societies). We did not have missing values for any of the other variables. Our sample for the multilevel analyses thus included 17,491 individuals in 26 societies (on average 673 respondents per society).

We estimated a series of models, starting with a random intercept model (Model 0) to examine whether there was any variance to be explained at the societal level. We then included societal religiosity as this is our main variable of interest (Model 1). Subsequently, we controlled for further societal-level variables (Model 2) and the individual-level variables (Model 3). To facilitate the interpretation of the results, all continuous variables were standardized around the mean before estimating the multilevel regression models. As our primary interest was with the association of the societal-level variables with acceptance of religious identity expression at the individual level, variables were standardized over the pooled dataset (Hox, 2010).
Acceptance of religious identity expression varied importantly between societies (see Figure 1). Support for religious identity expression was lowest in Lithuania, East Germany, Northern Ireland, and France—in these societies, less than 40% of the respondents agreed that the wearing of visible religious symbols in the workplace was acceptable. Most support—more than 70%—was found in Romania, Poland, Cyprus, and Malta. The random intercept model (Model 0, Table 3) revealed that about 9% of variance in support for the wearing of visible religious symbols was due to differences between societies (intraclass correlation = .089).

Next, we included societal religiosity in the model (Model 1). Results showed acceptance of religious identity expression to be higher in societies with a higher percentage of the population believing in God, $b = 0.12, t(24) = 2.53, p = 0.18$ (see Figure 2). This model explained 18% of the variance in acceptance of religious identity expression at the societal level.

In the next step, we added further societal-level variables. Given the relatively small sample size at the societal level, and the possible interdependence of the societal variables, we first estimated separate models including societal religiosity and one of the additional explanations. Results showed lower acceptance of religious identity expression in societies with more social globalization, $b = -0.10, t(23) = -2.22, p = .037$, a stronger endorsement of affective and intellectual autonomy, $b = -0.18, t(23) = -4.47, p < .001$, and $b = -0.14, t(23) = -3.16, p = .004$, respectively, and egalitarianism, $b = -0.12, t(23) = -2.59, p = .017$. A society’s dominant religious tradition, regulation of religion by the government, a communist past, religious diversity, the size of a Muslim minority, and the societal-level personality traits agreeableness and conscientiousness did not improve the model, all $\chi^2(1) < 8.3, ps > .05$, and were omitted from further analyses. In all models, except those controlling for intellectual or affective autonomy, societal religiosity contributed significantly—and with similar strength—to the acceptance of religious identity expression. Additional mediational analyses showed that societal religiosity was negatively related to intellectual and affective autonomy, $bs > - .40, ps < .001$. Sobel tests revealed...
Table 3. Results of Multilevel Analyses Explaining Acceptance of Wearing Visible Religious Symbols in the Workplace.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Intercept</th>
<th>M1: + societal religiosity</th>
<th>M2: + autonomy</th>
<th>M3: + individual-level variables</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b (SE)</td>
<td>B (SE)</td>
<td>b (SE)</td>
<td>B (SE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>2.61 (0.06)**</td>
<td>2.60 (0.05)**</td>
<td>2.59 (0.04)**</td>
<td>2.59 (0.04)**</td>
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<tr>
<td>Societal level</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Societal religiosity</td>
<td>0.12 (0.05)*</td>
<td>0.05 (0.04)</td>
<td>−0.06 (0.05)</td>
<td>−0.14 (0.05)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intellectual autonomy</td>
<td>−0.05 (0.05) [-0.15, 0.04]</td>
<td>−0.15 (0.06)** [-0.25, −0.05]</td>
<td>−0.06 (0.05) [-0.15, 0.04]</td>
<td>−0.14 (0.05)* [-0.25, −0.04]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affective autonomy</td>
<td>−0.15 (0.06)** [-0.25, −0.05]</td>
<td>−0.14 (0.05)* [-0.25, −0.04]</td>
<td>−0.06 (0.05) [-0.15, 0.04]</td>
<td>−0.14 (0.05)* [-0.25, −0.04]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual level</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (women)</td>
<td>−0.01 (0.01) [-0.04, 0.01]</td>
<td>−0.04 (0.01)* [-0.06, −0.03]</td>
<td>−0.01 (0.01) [-0.04, 0.01]</td>
<td>−0.04 (0.01)* [-0.06, −0.03]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>−0.04 (0.01)* [-0.06, −0.03]</td>
<td>−0.04 (0.01)* [-0.06, −0.03]</td>
<td>−0.01 (0.01) [-0.04, 0.01]</td>
<td>−0.04 (0.01)* [-0.06, −0.03]</td>
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<tr>
<td>Religious denomination (ref.: Catholic)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>−0.09 (0.03)** [-0.14, −0.03]</td>
<td>−0.00 (0.05) [-0.09, 0.09]</td>
<td>−0.09 (0.03)** [-0.14, −0.03]</td>
<td>−0.00 (0.05) [-0.09, 0.09]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orthodox</td>
<td>0.05 (0.04) [-0.02, 0.13]</td>
<td>0.09 (0.04) [0.01, 0.17]</td>
<td>−0.14 (0.02)** [-0.19, −0.10]</td>
<td>−0.02 (0.01)** [-0.04, −0.01]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Christian</td>
<td>0.09 (0.04) [0.01, 0.17]</td>
<td>0.09 (0.04) [0.01, 0.17]</td>
<td>−0.14 (0.02)** [-0.19, −0.10]</td>
<td>−0.02 (0.01)** [-0.04, −0.01]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other non-Christian</td>
<td>−0.14 (0.02)** [-0.19, −0.10]</td>
<td>−0.02 (0.01)** [-0.04, −0.01]</td>
<td>−0.14 (0.02)** [-0.19, −0.10]</td>
<td>−0.02 (0.01)** [-0.04, −0.01]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonreligious</td>
<td>−0.14 (0.02)** [-0.19, −0.10]</td>
<td>−0.02 (0.01)** [-0.04, −0.01]</td>
<td>−0.14 (0.02)** [-0.19, −0.10]</td>
<td>−0.02 (0.01)** [-0.04, −0.01]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right-wing political orientation</td>
<td>−0.14 (0.02)** [-0.19, −0.10]</td>
<td>−0.02 (0.01)** [-0.04, −0.01]</td>
<td>−0.14 (0.02)** [-0.19, −0.10]</td>
<td>−0.02 (0.01)** [-0.04, −0.01]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unexplained variance</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>0.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual level</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Societal level</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model fit</td>
<td>46,789.88</td>
<td>46,784.16</td>
<td>46,767.88</td>
<td>46,631.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deviance (−2LL)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degrees of freedom</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. CI = confidence interval.
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.
that the relation between societal religiosity on acceptance of religious identity expression was
mediated by the endorsement of intellectual and affective autonomy, \( z_s > 3.16, p < .002 \). Thus,
in societies with a higher societal religiosity, the endorsement of autonomy at the societal level
was weaker, which was in turn associated with a higher acceptance of the wearing of visible
religious symbols.

As only the endorsement of affective and intellectual autonomy affected the relationship
between societal religiosity and acceptance of religious identity expression, we only maintained
these variables in our further analyses (Model 2, Table 3). This model only identified society’s
endorsement of affective autonomy as a significant (negative) predictor of acceptance of reli-
gious identity expression, \( b = -0.15, t(22) = -3.01, p = .007 \).

As a final step in our analyses, we included the individual-level variables (Model 3).
Nonreligious respondents and those who identified as Protestant were less likely to accept the
wearing of religious symbols compared with respondents who identified as Catholic. Respondents
who were open to religious pluralism were found to be more favorable toward the wearing of
visible religious symbols. Older respondents and those with a more right-wing political orienta-
tion were found to be less accepting of the wearing of religious symbols. We obtained no signifi-
cant relation with gender. At the societal level, the association of affective autonomy remained
unchanged.

**Discussion**

In this study, we focused on the role of religion as part of culture across European countries in
allowing or inhibiting expressions of a religious identity through visible religious symbols. This
has become a major issue in recent debates throughout contemporary European societies, most
notably the wearing of headscarves by Muslim women, but also the presence of Christian cruci-
fixes. In this article, we particularly tested the assumption that a higher societal religiosity
encouraged the acceptance of the wearing of visible religious symbols.

We found that acceptance of religious identity expression varied substantially across European
societies. As expected, people in Western European societies, including France, Germany,
Belgium, and Denmark, which are among the most secularized societies in the Western world,
were more likely to oppose the wearing of visible religious symbols. On the contrary, people in
societies like Italy, Spain, and Portugal—where religion is typically deemed more important—
were more likely to accept the wearing of such symbols. Our multilevel analyses revealed that 9%
of the variance in acceptance of wearing visible religious symbols was due to differences between
societies. Including societal religiosity in the model substantially contributed to explaining
differences in acceptance of wearing visible religious symbols between societies. Our findings support the assumption that a stronger societal religiosity—measured as the percentage of people in society who indicated to believe in God—encouraged acceptance of visible religious symbols.

Subsequent analyses showed that the relation between societal religiosity and individual acceptance of religious identity expression was mediated by the societal level of endorsement of autonomy. Our findings showed higher societal religiosity to be related to a weaker endorsement of autonomy at the societal level, which in turn was associated with a higher acceptance of religious identity expression at the individual level. These findings seem to support the suggestion that in societies with a higher level of societal religiosity—which also typically endorse less autonomy—being religious may constitute a social norm for the majority population (indicated by its association with a weaker endorsement of autonomy), who are more likely to value observance of religious obligations, such as those pertaining to dress code (Foner & Alba, 2008; Niebuhr, 2007; Zolberg & Woon, 1999).

We explored whether other explanations at the societal level could account for our findings regarding societal religiosity. Our analyses controlling for religious denominational tradition, religious legislation, a society’s experience with communism, religious diversity including the size of a Muslim minority, or societal mean level of the personality traits agreeableness and conscientiousness showed that the association of societal religiosity with acceptance of religious identity expression did not change compared with the model that only included societal religiosity as a predictor. Societal religiosity contributed significantly—and with similar strength—to the acceptance of religious identity expression. The relation between societal religiosity and acceptance of religious identity expression can thus not be attributed to these societal features. The model testing the relation of social globalization and societal religiosity with acceptance of religious identity expression revealed that a higher level of social globalization predicted a lower acceptance of religious identity expression. This, however, did not change the association between societal religiosity and religious identity expression.

At the individual level, we found that respondents who identified themselves as nonreligious or Protestant were less likely than Catholic respondents to accept religious identity expression. This corresponds to previous research regarding the acceptance of the wearing of headscarves among religious respondents in predominantly Catholic societies (Fasel et al., 2013; Saroglou et al., 2009). People who were open to religious pluralism were found to be more accepting of religious identity expression. This is in line with previous research on the role of multiculturalism and diversity beliefs on support for different lifestyles (e.g., Kauff & Wagner, 2012; Van der Noll, 2012).

A limitation of the current study lies in the data we used. Our outcome variable—acceptance of the wearing of visible religious symbols in the workplace—is very generic. This is problematic for two reasons. First, some religious symbols may be perceived as having a political connotation (e.g., the Muslim headscarf, see Gustavsson, Van der Noll, & Sundberg, 2016; Saroglou et al., 2009) and people will probably be less willing to accept religious symbols that are perceived to have some political interpretation, compared with symbols that are purely seen as religious. Second, while responding to this question, respondents may have thought of religious symbols of their own tradition, or as symbols of other religious traditions, or both. The majority population may perceive religious identity expression from a religious minority as threatening (Rohmann et al., 2008), whereas religious identity expression of the religious majority may instead be seen as a way to hold on to—or even reinforce—their own traditions. Future research should therefore include more specific measures, referring to symbols of different religious groups and taking into account the possible different connotations, to examine if the societal level of religiosity also contributes to religious identity expression when it explicitly concerns a religious minority. A second limitation of the Eurobarometer data is that any items regarding individual religiosity—other than religious denomination—individual value orientations, or personality traits were not included. The interplay between societal religiosity and individual strength of religiosity, values, and personality remains therefore a topic to be addressed in future studies.
The aim of our study was to empirically test the assumption that the societal level of religiosity contributes to the acceptance of religious identity expression in general. Scholars who suggested that societal religiosity may play a role in the acceptance of religious identity expression often explicitly referred to religious practices in general or debates on immigration and the wearing of headscarves (Foner & Alba, 2008; Niebuhr, 2007; Zolberg & Woon, 1999). Despite its limitations, the dataset thus fulfills the prerequisites for testing this particular assumption. Results showed that the societal level of religiosity indeed predicts the acceptance of religious identity expression, even though the relationship was mediated by a lower endorsement of autonomy at the societal level.

We also aimed to provide more insight in how cross-European differences regarding the societal level of religiosity can contribute to the acceptance of religious identity expression. Our results show that Europe does not constitute a homogeneous group of societies and that it is useful to differentiate between European societies when examining individual attitudes toward key societal, moral, and convictional issues. Cross-European differences can provide important explanations for these differences. If anything, the variability of attitudes toward the public expression of religious symbols and acts may exemplify the underlying important variability across European societies of what are the European identities and how the religious identities fit with the national and the European identities.

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Notes
1. In most European societies, public discussions about religious identity expression started by controversies on the wearing of headscarves by Muslim women (Massignon, 2012). It may therefore well be that the acceptance of religious identity expression is related to the proportion of Muslims in society depending on the salience of the headscarf-debates. Lower acceptance of religious identity expression in countries with a higher Muslim population could be expected only if debates and controversies around Islamic religious identity expression were salient. It is however beyond the scope of the current study to examine through quantifiable indicators to what extent debates on Islamic religious identity expression have been salient in the various European societies (but see Massignon, 2012, for a review of such debates in some European societies).

2. Other, possible important concepts at the individual level include, for example, additional measures of individual religiosity, value orientations, and personality traits. Due to data limitations, we were not able to take these into account.

3. Most correlations at the societal level, however, did not exceed $r = .50$, except for correlations between social globalization and the government regulation index, $r = -.56$; social globalization and the cultural value orientations, $rs < .66$; and among the cultural value orientations, $rs < .64$.

4. Power analyses with PinT version 2.12 (Snijders & Bosker, 1993; Snijders, Bosker, & Guldemond, 2007) suggested that the analyses had sufficient power ($1 – \beta = .80$) to detect a small direct effect of a society-level variable at $\alpha = .95$.

5. An alternative possibility is that the relation between a stronger societal endorsement of autonomy and individual acceptance of religious identity expression is mediated by the societal level of religiosity. However, the association between societal endorsement of autonomy and individual acceptance of religious identity expression did not substantially change after removing societal religiosity from the model, $\Delta b < 0.03$. Furthermore, Sobel tests revealed that the indirect effect of endorsement of autonomy on individual acceptance of religious identity expression, via societal religiosity was non-significant, $zs < 2.0, ps > .069$. 


6. We also estimated a model that additionally included social globalization and the endorsement of egalitarianism. However, this did not improve the model, $\chi^2(2) = 0.19$, $p = .908$, and both variables were nonsignificant.

7. The difference between Catholic respondents and those who identified as religious but non-Christian was marginally significant. We should note, however, that the number of respondents who identified as (a) Christian other than Catholic, Protestant or Orthodox, or (b) religious but non-Christian are relatively small (4.1% and 3.8%, respectively) and these groups are possibly very diverse. A substantial interpretation about these two groups should, based on these results, therefore not be drawn.

References


